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RE-DISCOVERING DISCOVERY: A
FRESH LOOK AT THE OLD HOUND
by TERRENCE F. KIELY*
It's all very well for you to laugh Mr. Sherlock Holmes. You
may be very smart and clever, but the old hound is the best,
when all is said and done.t
Inspector Lestrade's retort to the world's most famous detective is a truism among members of the practicing bar. The slow,
steady gathering and analysis of information has always had
more to do with the successful practice of law than Holmesian deduction or the sudden flashes of insight so often portrayed in fictionalized accounts of the lawyer's role. The rules of discovery
are the primary mechanisms used in the process of shaping a client's often rambling and incomplete tale into a concrete factual
universe upon which professional skills can be applied.
As essential as discovery practice is in the lawyer's work-aday world, it has, due to the press of other matters, received insufficient attention in law school civil procedure and trial advocacy courses, continuing legal education programs and academic journals.1 Coverage in bar journals and other practice
oriented publications has been more extensive,2 but is too often
ignored as source material in currently used classroom texts.
It will be the purpose of this article to sketch the statutory
perimeters of the major civil 3 discovery devices, in the context
of analyzing recent Illinois decisions addressing various aspects
of discovery. It is hoped that this basically informational format
will be of benefit to the neophyte-whether a newly admitted
practitioner or one whose area of specialization seldom requires
use of the full panoply of discovery tools.
This article will be divided into six sections. The first will
address the primary issue of scope of discovery, regardless of the
SB.S.,

Loyola University; J.D., DePaul University; LL.M., New

York University. Mr. Kiely is a Professor of Law at DePaul University.
t A. C. DOYLE, A STUDY IN SCARLET 32 (Ballantine ed. 1975).
1. See, e.g., Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege, 46 CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 54 (1969); Comment, Equity's Bill of Discovery: A Unique Application in the Field of Products Liability, 49 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 124 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Katz & Gore, Discovery and the Special Appearance,

62 ILL. B.J. 12 (1973); Bua, Motion Practice in Circuit Court of Cook
County; a cursory outline, 54 CHI. B. REC. 231 (1973); Sprager, Deposi-

tions and Discovery, How to Win a Child Custody Action, 60 ILL. B.

J. 122 (1971).

3. Supreme Court Rules 411-15 provide for limited discovery in
criminal cases. ILL. Rv.STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 411-15 (1975).
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particular form by which it is initiated. This discussion will be
followed in turn by analyses of the four major discovery components: (1) written interrogatories; (2) requests for the admission of facts or the genuineness of documents; (3) accompanying
requests for the production of documents, objects and tangible
things; and (4) depositions, both discovery and evidentiary in
nature. The concluding section will scrutinize statutory measures and recent decisions regarding the sanctions available to the
trial court in the event of non-compliance with requests for discovery or ancillary court orders.
THE SCOPE OF DiscovERY

Supreme Court Rule 201 sets forth the general principles
which control the utilization of the information gathering devices
considered to be appropriate discovery methods. 4 Both time 5 and
sequence(' of discovery are provided for as is authorization for
the court to supervise7 the discovery process and issue protective
orders limiting, conditioning or restricting it in appropriate circumstances." Although not stated in Rule 201, discovery may
be initiated by service of notice, without the necessity of a preliminary court order. 9 Discovery is specifically prohibited in
suits for the violation of a municipal ordinance involving a fine1 °
or in small claims matters governed by Rule 287,11 without prior
leave of court. Subsection 201 (k), a new provision 12 relating to
motions seeking the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance,
will be discussed in the last section of this article.
Rule 201 also allows for the physical locale and manner of
discovery to be fixed by stipulation of counsel.' 3 This seldom
litigated but often exercised perogative of the attorney who effects priority notice was successfully challenged in the recent
REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 201 (1975).
(a) Discovery Methods. Information is obtainable as provided
in these rules through any of the following discovery methods:
depositions upon oral or written questions, written interrogatories
to parties, discovery or inspection of documents or property, and
physical and mental examination of persons. Duplication of discovery methods to obtain the same information should be avoided.
Id. § 201 (a).

4. ILL.

5. Id. § 201(d).

6. Id. § 201(e).
7. Id. § 201(c) (2).
8. Id. § 201(c) (1).
9. Under Supreme Court Rule 215, providing for the physical and
mental examinations of parties, a court order is necessary. ILL. REV.
ch. 110A, § 215(a) (1975).
10. Id. § 210(h).

STAT.

11. Id. § 201(g). See also id. § 287. A small claim is a civil action
based on tort or contract for money not in excess of $1,000, exclusive
of interest and costs.
12. Id.§ 201(k).

13. Id. § 201(i).
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case of Bicek v. Quitter.'4 In an action for personal injuries
brought by a minor against two defendants, counsel for one defendant served a notice of deposition to the plaintiff, requiring
his presence in counsel's Park Ridge office. Plaintiff's attorney
moved that the plaintiff only be required to attend one deposition
involving all parties and the co-defendant moved to quash the
notice maintaining that greater convenience to all concerned required that the deposition be taken in downtown Chicago. The
trial judge entered an order that the plaintiff's deposition be held
in his chambers due to counsels' inability to reach agreement on
a mutually agreeable location. When the Park Ridge counsel refused to appear, he was held in contempt of court and fined fifty
dollars.
The First Appellate District Court initially noted the absence
of evidence to sustain appellant's claim that it was standard practice for trial courts to order that depositions be taken in downtown Chicago whenever a dispute over location arose between
Chicago and suburban lawyers. It then clearly reaffirmed the
broad supervisory powers of the trial court with regard to the
discovery process:
We see no abuse of discretion on the face of the order and, in
fact, appellant does not claim an abuse of discretion here, but
rather that . . . the trial court cannot interfere with the location of the deposition stated in the notice as long as it is within
the county [where the deponent resides]. To sustain this argument would deprive a trial court of the discretionary power to
change the location vested in it by the language of Rule 203:
'or in any other place designated by an order of the court.' The
argument advanced also ignores the power given to the trial
court by Rule 201 to 'supervise all or any part of any discovery
procedure.'15

What Is "Relevant"?
The two most important provisions of Rule 201, subsections
(b) (1) and (b) (2), set out the two poles of discovery practicewhat is discoverable and what is not. An understanding of the
guidelines set out by each section is necessary to a working
knowledge of discovery provisions.
Rule 201(b) (1)16 sets the tone for the implementing sections
to follow by providing for full disclosure by both sides of all
matters "relevant" to the subject matter of the suit. This requirement of relevancy does not mean that the desired data must
qualify as evidence in the trial of the case. This important dis14. 38 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 350 N.E.2d 125 (1976).
15. Id. at 1030, 350 N.E.2d at 127.
16. ILL. Rsv.

STAT.

ch. 110A, § 201 (b) (1) (1975).
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tinction was established a decade ago by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the case of Monier v. Chamberlain,17 the ground-breaking decision which firmly established the principle of full disclosure in Illinois.
This same position was recently reaffirmed by the Second
Appellate District in Polowick v. Meredith Construction Co.' 8 In
Polowick, the plaintiff, prior to an oral deposition of a party defendant, had requested the production 9 of a number of the defendant company's financial records. After the ledger books had
been marked as exhibits by the court reporter, defense counsel
removed several pages. The trial court, based on a lack of relevancy, refused to order their production.
On appeal, the court stated, "the Illinois Supreme Court
has indicated that a liberal position is to be taken on discovery
of relevant and material evidentiary matter. . . and this includes
not only what would be admissible at the trial, but also that
which might lead to what would be admissible at trial. ' '20 Accordingly, the denial of discovery of the disputed pages was
deemed error.
Just who is responsible for disclosure of information is a related discovery question. The Illinois Supreme Court, in the 1971
case of Drehle v. Fleming2l addressed the concept of full discovery with regard to the common practice among insurance defense
attorneys 22 of completing requests for discovery themselves with
little or no client participation:
Discovery is not limited to matters within the knowledge of the
attorney who represents a litigant. A request for discovery is
addressed to the litigant. The attorney becomes involved because he is the agent of the litigant. Neither a litigant nor the
insurer of a litigant can frustrate discovery procedures by fragmenting its knowledge among different agents or attorneys. 23
Specifically designated as concomitants of full disclosure are the
availability of complete information as to the existence and location of knowledgeable individuals, as well as the description, nature, condition and location of all relevant documents and tangible items. To avoid any debate over the extent of the term
"document," it is stated to include, but not be limited to: papers;
photographs; films; recordings; books of account and other mem17. 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).

18. 29 Ill.
App. 3d 1092, 332 N.E.2d 17 (1975).
19. The request was made pursuant to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 204
(a) (3)

(1975).

20. Polowick v. Meredith Constr. Co., 29 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1097, 332
N.E.2d 17, 20 (1975)

(emphasis added).

21. 49 Ill. 2d 293, 274 N.E.2d 53 (1971).

22. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
23. Drehle v. Fleming, 49 Ill. 2d 293, 297, 274 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1971).
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orandums. The catchall term "communications" rounds out the
list by providing for the discovery of relevant information poten24
tially not covered by the preceding descriptions.
What Is "Privileged"?
The opposite pole of the discovery continuum, that of privilege, is governed by Rule 201 (b) (2), which states in pertinent
part:
All matters that are privileged against disclosure on the trial,
including privileged communications between a party or his
agent and the attorney for the party, are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure. Material prepared by
or for a party in preparation for trial is subject to discovery
only if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental impres25
sions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney.
The scope of this exception to the principle of full disclosure has
been interpreted in a series of decisions, the most important of
which concentrate on one of the two key factors present in most
disputes over its range: representation by insurance counsel and
problems raised by the personnel structures of corporate defendants.

26

The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Ryan, 27 extended
the full protection of the privilege to communications between
an insured, insurance claims representatives and counsel retained
by the liability insurance carrier. Apart from the collateral
source rule, which prohibits the factor of insurance from being
raised at trial, 28 the court held that as a matter of pre-trial discovery:
The insured is ordinarily not represented by counsel of his own
choosing either at the time of making the communication or during the course of litigation. Under such circumstances we believe
that the insured may properly assume that the communication
is made to the insurer as an agent for the dominant purpose
of transmitting it to
an attorney for the protection of the inter29
ests of the insured.
24. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(b) (1) (1975).
25. Id. § 201(b) (2). See also Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351,

221 N.E.2d 410 (1966); American Ins. Co. v. Formeller, 123 Ill. App. 2d
244, 263 N.E.2d 262 (1970); City of Chicago for Use of Schools v. Albert
J. Schorsch Realty Co., 95 Ill. App. 2d 264, 238 N.E.2d 426 (1968); Hawkins v. Potter, 44 Ill. App. 2d 314, 194 N.E.2d 672 (1963).
Most recently, the second appellate district reaffirmed the position
that in condemnation actions, the reports of appraisers are not considered
the work product of attorneys and hence there is no error in requiring
their production. Department of Bus. & Econ. Developers v. Pioneer T.
& S. Bank, 15 Ill. App. 3d 269, 349 N.E.2d 467 (1976).
26. Hawkins v. Potter, 44 Il. App. 2d 314, 194 N.E.2d 672 (1963);
Stimpept v. Abdour, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 194 N.E.2d 817 (1961).
27. 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
28. See, e.g., Cargnino v. Smith, 17 Ill. App. 3d 31, 308 N.E.2d 853
(1974); Bireline v. Esperchild, 15 Ill. App. 3d 368, 304 N.E.2d 508 (1973).
29. People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 460-61, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964).
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Conversely, the existence and amount of defendant's liability policy is discoverable. This information is considered "relevant" to
the subject matter of the suit in that it gives counsel a more
realistic appraisal of the case and provides a basis for possible
3 °
settlement. 1
As regards the discoverability of communications made in
the context of a corporate defendant's decision-making hierarchy,
Illinois courts have long adopted what is referred to as the "control group" principle as the determinative factor on the question
of privilege. In Day v. Illinois Power Co., 31 after adopting the
rule first formulated by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,3 2 the court clarified the scope of the doctrine:
If an employee or investigator making reports to an attorney
for the corporation is in a position to control or take part in
a decision about any action the corporation might take upon the
advice of its attorney, he personifies the corporation and when
he makes reports or gives information to the attorney, the attorney-client privilege applies. Such employee must have actual
authority,
not apparent authority to participate in a contemplated
33
decision.
Subsequent decisions, such as Golmina v. Fred Teitelbaum
Construction Co., 34 and Cox v. Yellow Cab Co.,35 while accepting
the control group concept as a functional method for setting a
limit on privilege in corporate settings, have held that such exclusionary guidelines are not meant to apply absolutely to statements made by anyone outside of the control group. As stated
by the court in Golmina, there are two important instances where
the non-member is entitled to assert the privilege:
[T]he principle underlying the attorney-client privilege would
demand that an employee's communication should be privileged
when the employee of the defendant corporation is also a defendant or is a person who may be charged with liability and makes
statements regarding facts with which he or his employer may be
charged, which statements are given or36 delivered to the attorney
who represents either or both of them.
In Schere v. Marshall Field & Co.,3 7 recently decided by the
30. Washburn v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 114 Ill. App. 2d 95, 252 N.E.2d
389 (1969).

31. 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964).
32. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
33. Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 2d 52, 58, 199 N.E.2d 802,

806 (1964).

34. 112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 251 N.E.2d 314 (1969).

35. 16 Ill. App. 3d 665, 306 N.E.2d 738 (1973).

36. Golmina v. Fred Teitlebaum Constr. Co., 112 Il.
449-50, 251 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1969).
37. 26 Ill. App. 3d 728, 327 N.E.2d 92 (1975).

App. 2d 445,
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first appellate district, both aspects of the privilege/work product issue were discussed. The disputed item was an accident report prepared by defendant's safety director. The report was
written on a pre-printed form supplied to defendant by, and subsequently submitted to, Safety and Claims Service, an independent adjusting service retained by defendant and defendant's excess liability carrier. Over defendant's objection on the basis of
privilege, the trial court ordered the report's production. Upon
refusal, defendant's counsel was held in contempt.
In rejecting defendant's assertion of the attorney client privilege under Rule 201(b) (2) ,3 the court of appeals noted the absence of the underlying relationship of insurer and insured, the
existence of which provided the basis for the application of priv39
ilege to the insured's communication in People v. Ryan.
Safety and Claims Service is an independent contractor retained
by both the defendant and by defendant's excess public liability
insurer to investigate and adjust claims. However, it is not an
insurer. The attorney-client privilege has never been extended
to cover communications to such third parties. . . . We therefore find no reason to extend the privilege40 to the instant
independent investigating and adjusting service.
The same result was necessitated under the "control group"
concept, upon examination of the decision-making status of defendant's safety director. 41 The net result in the particular case
was not unduly traumatic since defendant had offered to produce
the greater portion of the statement. The decision will have substantial future impact however in litigation involving self-insurers who retain independent adjusting firms. While the bulk of
reports prepared by such firms contain hearsay and most of the
data found therein is subject to indirect discovery by way of deposition, a core of valuable, confidential material may in fact remain and be subjected to discovery and possible damaging use
at trial.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 201(b) (2) (1975).
39. 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).

40. Shere v. Marshall Field & Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 728, 731, 327 N.E.2d

92, 94 (1975).
41. In the instant case, defendant admits that the author of the instant report was not within the corporation's control group and the
record contains nothing to indicate otherwise. We must therefore
conclude that Paul Lamb had no actual authority to participate in a

decision regarding what action the corporation might take upon the
advice of its attorney. In these circumstances the instant statement
was not privileged and was not discoverable.

Id. at 732, 327 N.E.2d at 95. In Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 38 Ill.
App. 3d 155, 349 N.E.2d 578 (1976), it was held that facts originally ob-

tained via a statement of an officer of defendant corporation, and thus
properly suppressed due to the control group/work product privilege,
could be the subject of a subsequent request for the admission of facts.
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WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES

Supreme Court Rule 21342 provides for the serving of written
questions regarding matter relevant to the subject matter of the
suit, which must be answered or objected to by the recipient
within 28 days of service. While the rules themselves do not
specifically mandate any particular discovery sequence, 43 the
written interrogatory is normally the first discovery tool utilized
44
by counsel in the information gathering process.
The answers to interrogatories serve several important purposes at the inception of a civil case. They provide counsel with
a preliminary information base with which to: ascertain the factual perimeters of the dispute; determine the basis for the subsequent gathering of relevant data; and provide a structure for
the later oral depositions of parties, important witnesses or other
knowledgeable individuals. Pursuant to the principle of full disclosure noted above, counsel may ask a wide-ranging series of
factual questions covering any aspect of the case deemed relevant.
Since a court order is not necessary to initiate discovery, and
court supervision is rare, counsel are urged to use discretion in
the utilization of the various discovery techniques. Rule 213(b) 45
delineates the duty of counsel in regard to the serving of interrogatories. 40 This section complements Rule 201 (a),47 which provides that duplication of discovery methods to obtain the same
information is to be avoided.
The major limitations on the nature of the questions propounded under Rule 213, in addition to the aforementioned relevancy base, are that the recipient need not reply to inquiries that
are not answerable through his or her personal knowledge, 48 that
call for a legal conclusion 49 or that require the recipient to estimate the relevancy of facts. 0 Accordingly, such questions may
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 213 (1975).
43. People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226
N.E.2d 6 (1967).

44. In products liability cases this may be required as a first step

by the trial court. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, § 213(b) (1975).
46. It is the duty of an attorney directing interrogatories to restrict
them to the subject matter of the particular case, to avoid undue delay, and to avoid the imposition of any unnecessary burden or expense on the answering party.

Id.

47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(a) (1975).
48. Smith v. Realcoa Constr. Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 254, 300 N.E.2d

855 (1973).

49. Rosales v. Marquez, 55 Ill. App. 2d 203, 204 N.E.2d 829 (1965);
Reske v. Klein, 33 Ill. App. 2d 302, 179 N.E.2d 415 (1961).
50. Grant v. Paluch, 61 Ill. ADIp. 2d 247, 210 N.E.2d 35 (1965); Nelson
v. Pals, 51 111. App. 2d 269, 201 N.E.2d 187 (1964).
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be objected to. In instances where the answer to a question may
only be provided by the scrutiny of numerous documents, the
recipient has the option of specifying these and making them
available for inspection and copying.5 1
Rule 213(e) 5 2 provides that once the recipient has fully answered the interrogatories he has no duty to disclose further
data, relevant to the questions asked, that subsequently comes
to his attention unless specifically requested to do so by receipt
of supplemental interrogatories at a later date. To avoid surprising counsel with a witness obtained just prior to trial, where
counsel has not issued supplemental interrogatories as a means
of learning the witness' identity for deposition purposes, the section provides that upon request a party must furnish, at any time
before trial, a list of knowledgeable individuals not indicated in
previously answered interrogatories. 8
In addition to their primary function in providing counsel
with a preliminary information base for the subsequent structuring of the case, answers to interrogatories may be used to impeach a witnesses' testimony5 4 or serve as admissions in the same
manner as any other admission. 55 Rule 213(f), in regard to impeachment, states that the answers "may be used in evidence to
the same extent as a discovery deposition." 56 Rule 213(f) specifies that interrogatories may be put to the same uses as depositions pursuant to Rule 212. Sections (a) and (b) of Rule 21258
differentiate between discovery and evidentiary depositions. A
discovery deposition may be used for: (1) impeachment purposes; (2) admission purposes; (3) providing any exception to
the hearsay rule and (4) any other purpose for which an affidavit may be used. 59 All or any part of an evidentiary deposition
(interrogatory) may be used for any purpose for which a discovery deposition (interrogatory) may be used and for any purpose
whatever as long as the deponent is unable to be produced in
the courtroom. 60 The evidentiary-use-of-a-discovery-deposition
provision of Rule 213 was recently given a unique application
by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Sierens v. Clausen.61
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 213(d) (1975).

52. Id. § 213(e).
53. Id.
54. Tolman v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 38 Ill. 2d 519, 233 N.E.2d 33
(1967).
55. Id. See also Flewellen v. Atkins, 99 Ill. App. 2d 409, 241 N.E.2d
667 (1968).
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 213 (f) (1975).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 212(a) (discovery depositions); § 212(b)
ositions) (1975).

59. Id. § 212(a) (1975).
60.

Id. § 212(b)

(1975).

61. 60 Ill. 2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975).

(evidentiary dep-
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In Sierens, the plaintiffs, grain elevator operators, sued defendant-farmer for the alleged breach of two oral contracts for
the sale of soybeans. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
due to the absence of any allegation of a writing signed by him
as required by section 2-201(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code6 2 for a sale of goods over five-hundred dollars. He also
urged that the more liberal "confirmation" section of section
2-201(2), 63 applicable to merchants, had no bearing because he
was a farmer. The circuit court granted the defendant's motion
64
and the appellate court affirmed.
Defendant's answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories indicated
that he had been a farmer for 34 years and that over the five
preceding years he had sold sizeable crops to grain elevators. The
Supreme Court held that the answers provided a sufficient factual basis for finding the defendant to be a "merchant" and
thereby governed by the confirmation rule of section 2-201(2) .6
Sierens illustrates that certain facts may be found by treating
defendants' answers to discovery interrogatories as an affidavit.
The court noted that while actual affidavits were not filed,
Supreme Court Rules 213(f)0 6 and 212(a) (4) 67 allowed treating
the answers to interrogatories as such:
Our rules provide that 'answers to interrogatories may be used
in evidence to the same extent as a discovery deposition' (Rule
213 (f), . . . and that discovery depositions may be used for 'any
purpose for which an affidavit may be used' (Rule 212(a) (4)).
The facts stated in defendant's answers to the interrogatories
were therefore before the circuit court for its consideration when
it ruled on defendant's motion. 68
Thus, while answers to discovery interrogatories do not have sufficient evidentiary value to allow counsel to avoid the necessity
of proof at trial of the facts contained therein, the Sierens decision now specifically allows for their use as a factual basis in
pre-trial motions.
ADMISSION OF FACTS OR THE GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS

Supreme Court Rule 216,69 providing for requests for the admission of facts or the genuineness of documents, is an important
but seldom used discovery device. Whether this is due to an
attorney's tactical decision to establish key facts during the ac2-201(1) (1975).
Id. § 2-201(2).
21 Ill. App. 3d 540, 315 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-201(2) (1975).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 213(f) (1975).
Id. § 212(a) (4).
Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 588, 328 N.E.2d 559, 561 (1975).
69. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 216 (1975),
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, §
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tual trial for maximum impact, wariness due to uncertainty over
the provision's appropriate uses, or general unfamiliarity with
the rule itself, it has received limited attention in reported deci70
sions which reflects its minimal use by counsel in daily practice.
As with answers to interrogatories, requests pursuant to
Rule 216 must be grounded on the factual aspects of the case.
While the admission or failure to object to a Rule 216 request
establishes the fact, as answers to interrogatories generally do
not, the nature of the request has the same limitations as to rel71
evancy, personal knowledge or legal conclusions.
Due to the evidentiary weight given to responses elicited
under Rule 216, the nature of proper objections to submitted reinterrogaquests is much more formalized than that required for
72
tories. Rule 216(c) states proper objection procedure.
While the benefits provided counsel from the more extensive
use of this device in terms of saved trial expense are potentially
great, its major use to date appears to be that of establishing
prior to trial the market value of services rendered or property
losses.7 3 One of the few recent decisions discussing Rule 216,
Crest v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,7 4 does
so in the property loss context.
In Crest, the insured brought a contract action against his
liability and automobile collision carrier due to its refusal to pay
his automobile damage claim. The carrier appealed a judgment
in the plaintiff's favor, in part based on the absence of any evidence as to the fair market value of the alleged loss. The court,
70. See, e.g., Breault v. Feigenholtz, 54 Ill. 2d 173, 296 N.E.2d 3
(1973); Crum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 988, 299 N.E.2d 820
(1973); Deaton v. Loyds Jewelry Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 926, 289 N.E.2d 123
(1972).
71. Breault v. Feigenholtz, 54 Ill. 2d 173, 296 N.E.2d 3 (1973). See
text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
72. (c) Admission in the Absence of Denial.
Each of the matters of fact and the genuineness of each document
of which admission is requested is admitted unless, within 28 days
after service thereof, the party to whom the request is directed serves
upon the party requesting the admission either (1) a sworn state-

ment denying specifically the matters of which admission is re-

quested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written objections on the

ground that some or all of the requested admissions are privileged
or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in whole or

in part. If written objections to a part of the request are made, the

remainder of the request shall be answered within the period designated in the request. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of
the requested admission.

If good faith requires that a party deny

only part, or requires qualification, of a matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and deny
only the remainder.

ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 1l0A, § 216(c) (1975).

73. See, e.g., Association of Franciscan Sisters of Sacred Heart v.

Homola, 131 Ill. App. 2d 904, 269 N.E.2d 532 (1971).

74. 20 Ill. App. 3d 382, 313 N.E.2d 679 (1974).
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while recognizing that no evidence in that regard had been presented at trial, noted that the defendant had failed to answer
a request under Rule 216 to admit "the actual cash value of the
collision was and is $2,224.04." Citing Rule 216, the court found
the defendant's failure to answer the request established the fact
75
and hence had evidentiary value at trial.
DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS, OBJECTS AND TANGIBLE THINGS
Third on the list of major discovery tools is the request
for documents, objects and tangible things, governed by Supreme
Court Rule 214.76 The rule provides for an opportunity to photocopy or to receive copies of all relevant documentary materials
which are specified with sufficient particularity in the request.
It also provides for the inspection and photographing of tangible
objects. Since September 1, 1974, this process can be initiated
by service of notice of such requests, thus eliminating the necessity for a preliminary "Monier" order7 7 and bringing it in line
with the other discovery devices. Rule 214 states in relevant
part:
Any party may by written request direct any other party to produce for inspection, copying, reproduction and photographing,
specified documents, objects or tangible things . . . or to disclose
information calculated to lead to the discovery or whereabouts
of any of these items, whenever the nature, contents or condition of such. . . is relevant to the subject matter of the action.78
Rule 214 requires that compliance with requests be made
within 28 days, unless such time is extended by agreement of
counsel or a subsequent court order.79 While considerable flexibility in this regard is normally afforded by counsel, it is important to note that an extension request under the 1974 amendment
is to be accorded the same dignity as was the "Monier" order
under the prior rule. 0 In accordance with the foregoing, the
rule is that requesting counsel need not take any preliminary
court action as a prerequisite to making a motion for the imposition of sanctions due to lack of compliance.8 1
Specificity of Request
The Illinois Supreme Court has made it clear that the specificity requirement is to be taken very seriously by requesting
75. Id. at 387, 313 N.E.2d at 683.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 214 (1975).
77. See text accompanying notes 82-83 infra.
78. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. llOA, § 214 (1975).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Trippel v. Lott, 19 Ill. App. 3d 936, 312 N.E.2d 369 (1974)
and text accompanying note 138 infra,
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counsel so as to avoid the potential harassment of an adversary
in the course of obtaining data deemed relevant. This important
aspect of Rule 214 was addressed in terms of its predecessor sec2
tion in the major discovery decision of Monier v. Chamberlain:s
Basically, the question is whether each document or individual
items must be particularly described and identified by the moving party, or whether it is sufficient to request production of such
material by groups or categories of similar items. .

.

. What will

suffice as a reasonable description may well vary from case depending on the circumstances of each, but we believe that designation by category ordinarily is sufficient for these purposes.
. . . Requiring minute particularization of each document sought
process by enabling
might well unduly lengthen the discovery
83
the parties to engage in dilatory practices.
In People ex rel. General Motors v. Bua,8 4 a products liability
case, the supreme court returned to the specificity issue paying
greater attention to the practicabilities involved in the appropriate use of the category concept. While neither altering its earlier
position on full disclosure nor requiring any particular discovery
sequence, the court urged counsel to utilize written interrogatories under Rule 213 as a precursor to their request for documents.8

5

Tangible Objects
While the majority of the cases dealing with the scope of
discovery under Rule 214 or its predecessor have approached the
issue in the context of disputes over documents,8 6 an important
Illinois Supreme Court decision has approached the topic as it
relates to tangible objects. This aspect of Rule 214, of vital concern in the ever-expanding products liability field, has received
87
relatively little attention to date.
In Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware,Inc.,88 a products liability
82. 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
83. Id. at 356, 221 N.E.2d at 415.
84. 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
85. If such materiality or relevancy does exist we would think
that this could be determined by a judicious use of interrogatories.
While we indicated in Monier that the use of interrogatories was not
a necessary condition precedent to discovery, it is clear that their
prior use may be required by the trial judge, in the exercise of his
discretion where, as here, such prior use will substantially expedite
identification of relevant material.
Id. at 194, 226 N.E.2d at 14 (emphasis supplied).
86. For a complete analysis of this aspect of Rule 214, see the lengthy
opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. General Motors
Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Levin v Cleveland Welding Co., 118 Ohio App. 389, 187
N.E.2d 187 (1963); Petruk v. South Ferry Realty Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 249
(App. Div. 2d 1956); Salzo v. Vi She Bottling Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 357,
235 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1962); Nasoff v. Hills Supermarket, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d
417, 243 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1963).
88. 63 Ill. 2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
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suit was brought against a hammer manufacturer and a retailer
for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when a piece of the hammer
chipped, striking plaintiff in the eye. Defendant, under the predecessor Rule 214, obtained an order providing that the hammer
be made available for inspection and testing. Despite repeated
challenges to its propriety, an order providing for "destructive
testing"8 9 was eventually entered with what the court deemed
to be appropriate safeguards. 90 Upon refusal of plaintiff's counsel
to produce the hammer for testing, an order of contempt was
entered and an appeal taken.
Plaintiff maintained that "destructive testing" was not a permissible mode of discovery under Supreme Court Rules 201 and
214, since the provisions for "inspection" contained therein do not
specifically sanction every type of testing. It was the defendant's
position that in light of the realities of products liability litigation, destructive testing was well within the spirit of full disclosure inherent in all of the discovery rules.
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court 9 ' noted the
desirability of full disclosure in that the purpose of litigation was
best served when each party knows as much about the controversy as is reasonably practicable. It also emphasized the wide
discretion afforded the trial court, which is the final arbiter of
scope of discovery requests. In this context, however, special
problems arose: if the court provided for destructive testing,
adequate protective measures were mandated. Whatever the
method of testing, it should be relevant to the issues, the information must not be obtainable in any other less destructive way,
and it should be made certain that the alteration or destruction
of the item will not impair or prevent adequate presentation of
92
the case by the adversary.
After carefully scrutinizing the language of Rules 201 and
214 and noting the absence of any specific provision for such testing, the court turned to the basic policy questions involved in
the issue of destructive testing and concluded that such questions
should be determined by the supreme court, particularly since
the resolution could involve a possible amendment of the Supreme Court Rules, or an interpretation not theretofore approved
by the supreme court.93
89. This is a type of testing that necessitates destruction of all or part
of the allegedly defective item for purposes of chemical or structural
analysis.
90. The safeguards related to notice of place and time of testing, pres-

ence of plaintiff's representative at the test and possession of samples
obtained.

91.
N.E.2d
92.
93.

Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 195, 330
269 (1976).
Id. at 197, 330 N.E.2d at 271.
Id. at 199, 330 N.E.2d at 272.
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The Illinois Supreme Court, 94 after reaffirming the principle
of full disclosure and acknowledging the novelty of the question,
affirmed the trial court order. The supreme court also stressed
the factors of necessity and protecting against any trial disadvantages to the adversary that might result due to the method
or extent of the proposed tests and concluded:
[W]e hold that 'testing' whether 'destructive' or not, authorized
in the exercise of sound discretion of the trial court, falls within
the purview of 'inspection' under Rule 214, and disclosure of the
'nature' and 'condition' of tangible things under Rule 201(b) (1).
To hold otherwise would frustrate the objective of Rule 201 of
'full disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action. ..

.'

Our holding necessarily vests broad discretionary powers in
trial court, and 'such a breadth of power requires a careful exercise of discretion in order to balance the needs of truth and
excessive burden to the litigants.' (People ex rel. General Motors
Corp. v. Bua (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 180, 193, 226 N.E.2d 6, 14.) In
dealing with requests for testing and experimentation, the trial
court should avail itself of the provisions of section (c) of Rule
201 which authorize protective orders and the suprevision of discovery by the trial court. 9 5
Regrettably, the absence of more particularized supreme
court guidelines is unavoidable due to the wide variety of products and testing methods utilized in the products liability field.
Thus, one can only hope for a flexible attitude towards the Rules
by trial courts in their exercise of sound discretion. While the
issue of destructive testing will arise only in manufacturing defect cases,"6 perhaps the increased judicial experience in the
drafting of protective orders will result in a new Supreme Court
Rule dealing directly with this most complex discovery question.
DEPOSITIONS

The oral deposition is perhaps the most potent of the several
discovery devices available to counsel. Given the opportunity
to question under oath the adversary or an important witness,
counsel can utilize the data previously gathered, analyzed and
digested, in the context of the human dynamic which is so important in the eventual outcome of the actual trial. While the an94. 63 Ill. 2d 454, 349 N.E.2d 28 (1976).
95. Id. at 460-61, 349 N.E.2d at 30.
96. In design defect cases there would be no difficulty due to the
ready availability of similarly designed units manufactured by the defendant. Nor would the question arise where the warnings, instructions
or packaging are at issue. See also Klick v. R.D. Werner Co., 38 Ill.
App. 3d 575, 348 N.E.2d 314 (1976), which stressed the importance of
properly drafted supervisory orders for nondestructive testing of a defective unit and also held that such tests were not considered the testing
attorney's work product so as to justify a refusal to allow the presence
of adversary counsel's representatives during the course of such tests.
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swers to questions propounded at a discovery deposition gener-

ally are not evidence, the experience allows counsel a "dry run"
in which to gauge the deponent's recollection, demeanor and veracity and to estimate the ultimate impact such witness will have
on the trier of fact. Supreme Court Rules 202 through 212 govern the nature, scope and use of depositions.
Supreme Court Rule 20211 states the general purposes for
which depositions may be taken, whether discovery or evidentiary in nature.9 8 The right of parties to take depositions is consid-

ered fundamental to our adversary system and may not be
avoided by way of dilatory technical actions or simple noncompliance. 99 While the provision for the separate taking of discovery
and evidence depositions appears cumbersome, costly and time
consuming, the contrary federal practice of combining the two
was believed to limit and impair the utility of each. This is due
to what the drafting committee thought was the absence of suffi97. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 202 (1975). Supreme Court Rule 210
specifically provides for the taking of depositions by written question:

(a) Serving Questions; Notice. A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon written questions shall serve them
upon the other parties with a notice stating the name and address
of the person who is to answer them if known, or, if the name is
not known a general description sufficient to identify him, and the
name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken. Within 14 days thereafter a party so
served may likewise serve cross questions. Within seven days after
being served with cross questions a party may likewise serve redirect questions. Within seven days after being served with redirect
questions, a party may likewise serve recross questions.
(b) Officer To Take Responses and Prepare Record. The party
at whose instance the deposition is taken shall transmit a copy of
the notice and copies of the initial and subsequent questions served
to the officer designated in the notice who shall proceed promptly,
in the manner provided by rules 206(e) and 207, to take the testimony of the deponent in response to the questions and to prepare,
certify, and file or mail the deposition, attaching thereto the copy
of the notice and the questions received by him. No party, attorney,
or person interested in the event of the action (unless he is the deponent) shall be present during the taking of the deposition or dictate, write, or draw up any answer to the questions.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 210 (1975). Due to the cumbersome nature
of this discovery device and the prohibition against the presence of coun-

sel during the deposition, it is seldom used.

98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 202 (1975):
Any party may take the testimony of any party or person by
deposition upon oral examination or written questions for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action. The notice,
order or stipulation to take a deposition shall specify whether the
deposition is to be a discovery deposition or an evidence deposition.

In the absence of specification a deposition is a discovery deposition

only. If both discovery and evidence depositions are desired of the
same witness they shall be taken separately, unless the parties shall
stipulate otherwise or the court orders otherwise upon notice and
motion.
99. Slatter v. City of Chicago, 12 Ill. App. 3d 808, 299 N.E.2d 442
(1973).
100. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 202 (Smith-Hurd 19,75) (Historical

and Practice Notes).
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cient safeguards during the course of the unified deposition in
terms of its effective later use at trial. 10 0
Rule 204(a) (3) provides that a deposition of any resident
party or an officer, director or employee of a party may be initiated by notice, 1' 1 without the necessity of a subpoena. The
same procedure applies to the production of any documents that
the deposing party wishes brought to the deposition. The issuance of a subpoena can be required to initiate the deposition of
a nonparty or physician. 1 2 The clerk of the court has authority
under the rule to issue to nonparties subpoenas which are to
be accorded the same dignity as those issued by the court itself.
As regards physicians and surgeons, however, an actual court or10 3
dered subpoena is required.

The location and actual arrangements for the deposition is
left up to the parties who normally stipulate to mutually convenient terms.10 4 Under Rule 203,105 the court may order a nonresident to appear in this state or elsewhere for deposition purposes, whether discovery or evidence in nature. The deposition
may be taken before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
normally a court reporter, who, pursuant to Rule 206(e)'0 6 is to
swear the deponent and record and certify the testimony
given. 10'
As to the scope of questions propounded on oral deposition,
Rule 206(c) ,108 in keeping with the principle of full disclosure,
states that the deponent may be examined as to any relevant
matter subject to discovery under the rules. Questions whose answers would violate the attorney-client privilege or require a
legal conclusion'0 9 are not allowed and hence may be objected
to.
The form of questioning for discovery depositions is governed
by Rule 206(c) (1)110 which provides that the deponent may be
questioned as if under cross-examination, within the limitations
allowed in that mode of examination. In the course of an evidence deposition, the examination and cross-examination must
be conducted as if the deponent were being examined at trial."'
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. § 204(a) (3).
Id. §§ 204(a) (3), 204(a) (1).
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 201(i) (1975).

105. Id. § 203 (1975).

106. Id. § 206(e).
107. Prior to the initiation of questioning, signatures are normally

wailyed by counsel.

This saves the client the trouble of reading the

transcript after it has been typed and certifying its correctness.
108. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 206(c) (1975).

109. Carlson v. Healy, 69 Ill. App. 2d 236, 215 N.E.2d 831 (1966).

110. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 206(c) (1) (1975).
111. Id. § 206(c) (2).
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Rule 206 (d) allows for the termination of the deposition
when it is allegedly being conducted in bad faith or in a manner
that "unreasonably annoys, embarrasses or oppresses the deponent."'' 12 Rule 201 (c) (1), providing for the entry of protective
orders, empowers the court to take appropriate steps to insure
11
propriety when the deposition is resumed. 3
Use of Depositions
The most important provisions relative to the effective use
of depositions are set out in Rules 211 and 212,114 governing respectively, errors, irregularities and objections and the appropriate uses for deposition testimony. Rule 212 sets limits on the
use of both discovery and evidence depositions aside from their
information gathering and witness assessment functions. As regards the use of discovery depositions at trial, the rule provides
specific limitations. 1 5
If, as is normally the case, only a portion of a discovery deposition is utilized for any of the enumerated purposes, the opposing party is entitled to read or have read any other portion which
in fairness ought to be considered in connection with the part
read. 1 6 It is also important to note that the mere taking of a
deposition does not make the deponent the deposing party's witness." 7 However, the use of the deposition for any purpose other
than impeachment or to establish an admission does make the
deponent the witness of the offering party to the same extent
as if such witness were testifying as an adverse witness under
section 60 of the Civil Practice Act." 8
As to evidence depositions, which are generally the exception
rather than the rule in discovery practice, subsections (b) (1)(3) of Rule 212 control their use. 1 9 It is important to distinguish
112. Id. § 206(d).
113. Id.§ 206(c) (1).
114. Id.§§ 211-12.
115. Id.§ 212(a):

Discovery depositions taken under the provisions of this rule
may be used only:
(1) for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the deponent
as a witness in the same manner and to the same extent as any inconsistent statement made by a witness;
(2) as an admission made by a party or by an officer or agent
of a party in the same manner and to the same extent as any other
admission made by that person;
(3) if otherwise admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule;
or

(4) for any purpose for which an affidavit may be used.
116. Id. § 212(c).
117. Id. § 212(e).
118. Id.

119.
(b) Use of Evidence Depositions. All or any part of an
evidence deposition may be used for any purpose for which a discov-
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the right to take an evidence deposition from the right to use
it later at trial. Under prior law, 1 20 the issue of the later use
at trial of an evidence deposition was resolved by an examination
of the circumstances existing at the time it was taken. Under
present law, such use is determined under Rule 212(b) (1)-(3)
by reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the trial.
Due to this shift of emphasis, evidence depositions, which may
or may not be used as evidence at trial, may be taken even if
the deponent is in good health and residing in the jurisdiction.
In this latter regard, it is also important to note the circumstances wherein counsel for the party to be deposed may utilize
the deposition as evidence under Rule 212(b) (1)-(3) in the event
that initiating counsel chooses not to offer it. The fifth appellate district, in the case of Dobkowski v. Lowe's, Inc., 2 ' recently
has set guidelines to cover such a situation:
Where a plaintiff desires to introduce into evidence an evidence
deposition taken by the defendant, the proper procedure is for
the plaintiff to ask the defendant in open court whether he
intends to use the deposition in his case. If the defendant
answers affirmatively, the plaintiff may not use the deposition
in his case. If, after such an exchange, the defendant fails to
introduce the evidence deposition, the plaintiff should be permitted to reopen his case for the purpose of introducing the
deposition into evidence. If the defendant responds when questioned in open court that he does not intend to use the deposition,
the plaintiff may introduce the deposition into evidence as part
of his case.122
The party seeking to introduce the evidence deposition must
present sufficient facts to meet one of the admissibility criterion
ery deposition may be used, and may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds that at the time of the trial:
(1) the deponent is dead or unable to attend or testify because
of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment;
(2) the deponent is out of the country, unless it appears that
the absence was procured by the party offering the deposition, provided, that a party who is not a resident of this state may introduce
his own deposition if he is absent from the country; or
(3) the party offering the deposition has exercised reasonable
diligence but has been unable to procure the attendance of the deponent by subpoena; or finds, upon notice and motion in advance
of trial, that exceptional circumstances exist which make it desirable,
in the interest of justice and with due regard for the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used.
Id. § 212(b) (1975).
Rule 217 allows depositions for the purpose of perpetuating testimony. The statutory prerequisites are quite extensive. This device allows for the deposition to be taken prior to the filing of suit and has
many similarities to an evidence deposition. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1l0A, § 217 (Smith-Hurd 1975) (Historical and Practice Notes).
120. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 341 Ill. App. 293, 93
N.E.2d 516 (1950).
121. 20 Ill. App. 3d 275, 314 N.E.2d 623 (1974).
122. Id. at 279, 314 N.E.2d at 627.
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set out in Rule 212(b) (1)-(3) 123 and the trial court should make
such a finding on the record. This aspect of Rule 212 was recently discussed'in the case of Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan
for Hospital Care of Hospital Service Corp.,1 24 also decided by
the fifth appellate district.
In Ledingham, an action was brought for breach of contract
based on defendant hospitalization carrier's refusal to pay a
claim. The carrier's refusal was on the basis that the subject
illness was in existence within the 270 day period prior to the
effective date of the policy and hence not covered by its terms.
On that issue, plaintiff was allowed to introduce the evidence
deposition of her doctor who at the time of trial was confined
to a wheelchair. In rejecting defendant's position that the trial
court's failure to make a finding that Rule 212(b) (1) or (b) (3)
had been satisfied, thus making the introduction of the deposition
error, the court stressed the importance of the underlying facts
rather than the presence or absence of a formal determination
125
in such cases.
Supreme Court Rule 211, dealing with the effect of errors
and irregularities in the deposition itself and objection to questions asked, is of prime importance relative to the later use of
the deposition under the authority of Rule 212. Subsection (c),
the heart of the rule, which applies to both evidence and discovery depositions, provides for specific objection procedures. 1 20
This provision serves as the basis for the majority of appeals involving deposition related issues. The necessity of making an
123. See note 119 and accompanying text supra.
124. 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975).
125. [I]t seems clear in this case, the trial court erred in failing
to make a finding that 'deponent is . . .unable to attend or testify
because of . . .infirmity . . .' However, it is also clear that this
failure does not require a reversal ... because the doctor, who was
confined to a wheelchair, and who felt that he could not testify,
would be exempt from testifying in person. The deposition was
proper in this case: the trial court merely did not find, as it should
have at the time of trial, that the deponent was infirm.
Id. at 353, 330 N.E.2d at 550.
126. ILL. REv.STAT.ch. 110A, § 211(c) (1)-(4) (1975):
(c) As to Competency of Deponent; Admissibility of Testimony;
Questions and Answers; Misconduct; Irregularities. (1) Grounds of
objection to the competency of the deponent or admissibility of testimony which might have been corrected if presented during the taking of the deposition are waived by failure to make them at that
time; otherwise objections to the competency of the deponent or admissibility of testimony may be made when the testimony is offered
in evidence.
(2) Objections to the form of a question or answer, errors and
irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of
any person, and errors and irregularities of any kind which might
be corrected if promptly presented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition.
(3) Objections to the form of written questions are waived un-
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initial objection to the nature, form, or factual content of a question or answer and of continuing to object if the deposition proceeds on the same inappropriate line of inquiry, was recently
127
emphasized in the case of Neuner v. Schilling Petroleum Co.
In Neuner, the plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer and the installer of an underground gasoline pipe in a store
near the plaintiff's property, for damages sustained when gasoline leaked into his basement and well. Plaintiff took the evidence deposition of an expert who, when questioned on the basis
of a set of hypothetical facts, stated his opinion that the leak
was caused by the overtightening of a fitting during installation
of the pipeline. Defendant objected to the question based on the
absence of sufficient ultimate facts in the question and supplied
the same. The deponent then stated that the fitting was "apparently overtightened." Defendant again objected on the basis that
the opinion was not grounded on sufficient facts. The witness
again responded that overtightening "appeared" to be the cause.
Thereafter, defense counsel did not object or move that such testimony be stricken, all of which the deposition transcript reflected. At trial, the evidence deposition was admitted and
judgment entered in the plaintiff's favor.
In rejecting the defendant's contention that his objections
to the expert's testimony were sufficient for review by the trial
court, the appellate court noted objecting counsel's duty to point
out the defects in a hypothetical question and stressed the necessity of continued objections to avoid a waiver under Rule 211:
Although [defense] counsel objected to the form of the
hypothetical, he was allowed to alter it, and Deppe's response
was the same to the hypothetical in its amended form. As to
the objection concerning the evidentiary insufficiency for Deppe's
opinion that the fitting was 'apparently overtightened,' this also
was remedied by reaffirmance. Thus, defendant's counsel must
be seen as acquiescing in the responses to the amended questions.
Viewed as such, the objections were insufficient to remove [the
defendant] from the effect of the above-stated rule. Accordas to factual insufficiency of
ingly, defendant Hirth's objections
1 28
Deppe's conclusions were waived.
An additional issue raised by the defendant in Neuner was
whether the trial court's reliance on an evidence deposition alless served in writing upon the party propounding them within the
time allowed for serving succeeding questions and, in the case of the
last questions authorized, within seven days after service thereof.
(4) A motion to suppress is unnecessary to preserve an objection seasonably made. Any party may, but need not, on notice and
motion obtain a ruling by the court on the objections in advance of

the trial.

127. 26 Ill. App. 3d 148, 325 N.E.2d 34 (1975).
128. Id. at 150, 325 N.E.2d at 36.
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lowed for an exception to the long followed principle that an
appellate court should give deference to the trial court's ability to
judge the credibility of witnesses, when the issue on appeal is
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. The appellate court, after noting that substantial live testimony was presented at trial, held that "review of a single deposition provides
an insufficient basis on which to substitute judgment where live
129
testimony was also given.
SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE

Due to the importance of prompt and complete compliance
with requests for discovery in the process of counsel's application
of professional skills, a wide variety of sanctions are available
to trial courts in instances of entire or partial noncompliance.
Supreme Court Rule 219180 makes provision for appropriate sanctions at each stage of the discovery process.
Subsection (a) specifically makes costs and attorney's fees
available in cases of refusal, without substantial justification, to
answer interrogatories, questions propounded on oral deposition,
or to fully comply with a request for production. The same sanction may be imposed against the moving party if the court determines that the motion seeking the imposition of sanctions was
13 1
made without substantial justification.

Rule 219(c) sets forth the major sanctions available to the
trial court. They are applicable to cases of alleged noncompliance under any of the discovery devices. 18 2 The sanctions range
129. Id. at 151, 325 N.E.2d at 37.
130. ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 11OA, § 219 (1975).
131. Id. § 219(a).
132.
(c)Failure to Comply with Order or Rules. If a party,

or any person at the instance of or in collusion with a party, unreasonably refuses to comply with any provisions of rules 201 through
218, or fails to comply with any order entered under these rules, the
court, on motion, may enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders as are just, including, among others,
the following:
i) that further proceedings be stayed until the order is complied with;
(ii) that the offending party be debarred from filing any other
pleading relating to any issue to which the refusal or failure relates;
(iii) that he be debarred from maintaining any particular claim,
counterclaim, third-party complaint, or defense relating to that issue;
(iv) that a witness be barred from testifying concerning that is8ue; (v) that, as
to claims or defenses asserted in any
pleading to
which that issue is material, a judgment by default be entered
against the offending party or that his suit be dismissed with or
without prejudice; or
(vi) that any portion of his pleadings relating to that issue be
stricken and, if thereby made appropriate, judgment be entered as
to that issue.
In lieu of or in addition to the foregoing, the court may order that
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from a simple stay of the proceedings to a dismissal of those
counts of the complaint relating to the noncompliance with judgment entered against the noncomplying party, where appropriate.
A 1974 amendment to Rule 201, the general discovery provision, specifically places on initiating counsel the burden of assessing the sufficiency of compliance by the recipient. The assessment must be realistic in light of the substantial time demands of practice. Rule 201(k), the new provision, provides:
Reasonable Attempt to Resolve Differences Required. Every
motion with respect to discovery shall incorporate a statement
that after personal consultation and reasonable attempts to
resolve differences the parties have been unable to reach an
accord. The court may order that reasonable costs, including
attorneys' fees, be assessed against a party or his attorney who
unreasonably fails to facilitate discovery under this provision. 133
This provision has substantially reduced the'number of motions seeking the imposition of sanctions immediately after the
standard statutory period of twenty-eight days for compliance
has passed. In addition to diminishing this costly and time consuming aspect of discovery practice, valuable court time is saved
for more important matters. Prior to the amendment many trial
courts, recognizing an attorney's time constraints, felt compelled
to withhold sanctions until noncompliance with one or more previous orders, mandating compliance with prior requests under
the rules, was demonstrated. Hopefully Rule 210(k), applicable
to all forms of discovery, will eliminate this vicious circle.
The imposition of sanctions is within the sound discretion
of the trial court and is meant to serve as an impetus to achieving the goal of full disclosure, not as a punishment to the recalcitrant or dilatory party.13 4 Since all discovery can be initiated
by request, it is important to realize that regardless of particular
court practices, no preliminary court order need be violated as
a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions under Rule 219. The
the offending party or his attorney pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by any party as a result of the misconduct, and by contempt proceedings compel obedience by any
party or person to any subpoena issued or order entered under said
rules.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 219 (c) (1975).
Counsel's subjecting himself to a contempt citation is an appropriate
method of challenging on appeal the entry or scope of a pre-trial discovery order. See Bicek v. Quitter, 38 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 350 N.E.2d 125
(1976).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 201(k) (1975).
134. People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226
N.E.2d 6 (1967).
135. 25 Ill. App. 3d 864, 323 N.E.2d 435 (1975).
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importance of this fact was recently emphasized in two appellate
court decisions, Savitch v. Allman 13 5 and Trippel v. Lott.1 6
In Savitch, attorney's fees were assessed against the plaintiff's attorney for unreasonable refusal to answer interrogatories.
After holding that a six month delay constituted an "unreasonable" refusal, the court discussed the purpose of imposing minor
sanctions in such cases:
It is obvious that to impose no sanction of any kind would create
a feeling among attorneys that discovery deadlines could be
lightly ignored and even willfully flaunted. The deadlines are
imposed for significant reasons, particularly to keep the litigation constantly progressing toward a prompt and just termination, and to insure that
evidence is made available to both sides
13 7
while it still exists.
In response to the appellant's placing great weight on the
fact that defense counsel did not attempt to obtain a court order
mandating compliance, the court stated:
There is nothing in the rules which requires that such action
be taken by the party complaining of a failure to comply with
the rules of court. The rules have specific provisions for procedures for sanctions in the event of a failure to comply with provisions of the rules. It is not a prerequisite to the action to
require the imposition of sanctions under Rule 219 that a preliminary court order be sought, obtained, and thereafter ignored
by the offending party. . . . If a specific order was required
in all cases before sanctions are imposed, a dilatory attorney
could simply delay as long as he wished, with consequential
inconvenience to the court and other litigants, until he is commanded by order to perform an act which is required by the
rules. No such procedure is required nor would it be desir8
able.13
On similar reasoning, the court in Trippel v. Lott13 9 upheld
the trial court's suppression of a statement made by the plaintiff,
due to the defendant's failure to produce it pursuant to a
"Monier" order 1 40 for its production:
Further, we specifically reject the defendant's suggestion
that the plaintiff was under a duty to further enforce the original
Monier order that she caused to be entered, and that her failure
136. 19 Ill. App. 3d 936, 312 N.E.2d 369 (1974).
137. 25 Ill. App. 3d 864, 868, 323 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1975).
See also
North Park Bus Service, Inc. v. Pastor, 39 Ill. App. 3d 406, 349 N.E.2d
664 (1976), affirming the trial court's order that counsel pay $100 for
failure to produce requested documents.
138. 25 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869, 323 N.E.2d 435, 439 (1975).
But see
Acosta v. Chicago Transit Auth., 39 Ill. App. 3d 80, 349 N.E.2d 613
(1976), where the court, in affirming the decision of the trial court to
allow a witness who had not been listed in answers to interrogatories
to testify, stressed the absence of any action on the plaintiff's part to
compel complete answers after service of the interrogatories. See the
discussion of this case in the text accompanying notes 152-53 infra.
139. 19 Ill. App. 3d 936, 312 N.E.2d 369 (1974).
140. See text accompanying notes 82-83 and note 85 supra.

1977]

Civil Discovery in Illinois

to do so until a short time prior to trial somehow excused the
defendant from producing the statement until then. . . . Were
we to adopt the defendant's suggestion we would not only be
responsible for further lengthening the already considerable
delay in personal injury actions in this district, but we would
do violence to the spirit and intent of the Monier decision itself
141
• ..and the Supreme Court rules that implement that holding.
It appears clear that the language of the Trippel decision will
be applicable to requests for production under revised Rule 214
which eliminates the necessity of a preliminary court (Monier)
order to initiate discovery.
Limitations on the Imposition of Sanctions
As noted above, while the imposition of sanctions under Rule
219 is within the discretion of the trial court, the rule itself sets
limits on its use by requiring that there be a reasonable relation
between the requested sanction and the nature of the noncompliance by the dilatory party. Specifically, subsections (c) (ii), (c)
(iii), (c) (v) and (c) (vi) of Rule 219,142 providing for the debarring of particular pleadings or claims, judgments by default and
the striking of pleadings in whole or in part, are conditioned by
the requirement that the information constituting the basis for
the motion for sanctions have some relation to the particular
sanction desired.
The Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. General Motors
v. Bua,1 43 has interpreted the predecessor rule to Rule 219 as
"authorizing pleadings to be stricken only when the stricken
pleadings bear some reasonable relationship to the information
withheld. ' 144 This position was recently affirmed with regard
to Rule 219 in the case of Department of Transportation v.
Zabel, 1 45 decided by the third appellate district.
In Zabel, the trial court dismissed a petition for the condemnation of land belonging to the defendant due to the plaintiff's
failure to produce, pursuant to a "Monier" order, all appraisals
of the land being condemned and that remaining. In holding
that the trial court committed error, the appellate court stressed
both the reasonable relationship principle and the availability of
other, less severe sanctions:
Obviously a 'reasonable relationship' should be required as a
minimum when the sanction is not merely the striking of pleadings but the ourtright dismissal of the case. As clearly expressed
141. 19 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942-43, 312 N.E.2d 369, 374 (1974).
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 219(c) (i)-(vi) (1975).
143. 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
144. Id. at 197, 226 N.E.2d at 16.
145. 29 Ill. App. 3d 407, 330 N.E.2d 878 (1975).
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in cases considering the issue of sanctions, the action of the court
in imposing such sanctions should be such as to promote the goal
of discovery, not to punish the offending party . . . . The dismissal of a cause with prejudice is a drastic sanction and should
be employed only as a last resort, when the uncooperative party
shows 'a deliberate contumacious or unwarranted disregard of

the court's authority' ....

146

Even though the reasonable relation rule and the view of
dismissal as a last resort set some limits on the severity of sanc-

tions, continued refusal to comply with requests for discovery
have and will continue to serve as the basis for the imposition
of this ultimate sanction. A recent factual precedent in this regard is provided by the case of Bender v. Pfotenhauer,1 47 decided
by the third appellate district.
In Bender, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice due to his consistent failure to attend scheduled depositions. In rejecting the appellant's argument that less restrictive
sanctions were appropriate, the court stated:
While we are reluctant to approve a dismissal of an action as
a consequence of failure to comply with court orders and rules,
we are reminded by defense counsel that '[u]nder our system
of representative litigation the general rule is that the client is
bound by the acts and8 omissions of his lawyer-agent in the prose14
cution of a remedy.

Rule 219 (c) (iv) 149 which provides for the barring of oral testimony or documentary evidence at trial if the data contained
therein or the identity of the person to testify was the subject
of a request for discovery that was not complied with, was recently considered by the first appellate district in the case of
Anderson v. City of Chicago.150 In Anderson, an action for personal injuries by a pedestrian struck by a police car, the court
146. Id. at 410, 330 N.E.2d at 880. See also North Michigan Ave. Bldg.,
Inc. v. Fact System, 25 Ill. App. 3d 529, 323 N.E.2d 493 (1975).
147. 21 Ill. App. 3d 127, 315 N.E.2d 137 (1974).
148. Id. at 130, 315 N.E.2d at 139 (citing Danforth v. Checker Taxi Co.,
114 Ill. App. 2d 471, 253 N.E.2d 114 (1969)). The Bender court goes
on to state:
In the case before us, plaintiff failed to appear for a discovery
deposition in May, with no reason given for such failure. It was
shown that he failed to obey the court order entered on June 29,
for a deposition on July 19, with no reason given for such failure.
He also failed to appear for a pretrial conference on August 20 with
no sound reason given. The court vacated the August 20 order of
dismissal and set October 24, 1973, a time agreeable to plaintiff, as
the time for the taking of the deposition. As indicated, neither plaintiff nor his counsel was present at the appointed time at 1:30 P.M.
on that date.
Id. Cf. Conover v. Smith, 20 Ill. App. 3d 258, 314 N.E.2d 638 (1974) (dismissal for failure to attend pre-trial conference reversed as being too
severe considering that counsel was at trial elsewhere).
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 219 (c) (iv) (1975).
150. 29 Ill. App. 3d 971, 331 N.E.2d 243 (1975).
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allowed a witness to testify over the defendant's objection that
the interrogatories requesting the names of all prospective witnesses were never answered. Upon the plaintiff's statement that
such interrogatories had never been received, the court allowed
the answers to be given in open court. The court also gave the
defendant an opportunity to depose the testifying witness which
was done on the day before her court appearance. Judgment
was entered in plaintiff's favor.
On appeal, in rejecting the defendant's contention of trial
court error in allowing the testimony, the court emphasized the
absence of the factors normally present in cases upholding the
exclusionary sanction under the rule holding "[w]e have reviewed the cases cited by defendants and find them to be distinguishable on the facts. Suffice it to say, those decisions involve
extreme cases of bad faith, surprise, inadequate opportunity to
investigate, or other such factors not present here."''1 1
Other important considerations were noted. The court emphasized that the case at bar was tried before the court sitting
without a jury, and that there was some question as to whether
plaintiff's counsel received the requested interrogatories prior to
trial. It was also observed that defense counsel was offered, but
declined, a continuance by the court in order to allow a sufficient
opportunity to investigate the matter. In light of all these mitigating factors, the court concluded that whatever prejudice there
might be, it was insufficient to warrant imposition of the exclusionary sanction.
A similar result was reached in Acosta v. Chicago Transit
Authority,' 52 decided by the first appellate district on similar
facts. In upholding the trial court's allowing the testimony of
a bus driver whose name had not been listed in the defendant's
answers to interrogatories, the court stressed, as in Anderson,
the necessity for a clear showing of prejudice prior to the barring of testimony as a sanction for noncompliance:
Plaintiff in the case before us filed her interrogatories on October
26, 1973. No further production orders were requested. Not
until April 30, 1974, while the trial was in progress did plaintiff
ask the court for sanctions against defendant for his failure to
respond to her interrogatories. Plaintiff requested that the bus
driver whose name was not given in response to the two
interrogatories be barred from testifying at trial. She did not
ask for a continuance to depose or interview the bus driver.
Furthermore, she knew the number of the bus in question and
yet did not ask for the name of the bus driver. She did not
pursue the answers to her interrogatories from the date of filing
151. Id. at 978, 331 N.E.2d at 248.
152. 39 Ill. App. 3d 80, 349 N.E.2d 613 (1976).
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until the bus driver was actually called as a witness. We are
of the opinion the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the bus driver to testify. 15 8
CONCLUSION

This sketch of Illinois discovery rules, case law and practice
is obviously not meant to supplant a solid reading and study of
the rules and cases themselves. Its purpose has been to acquaint
or refresh the reader's recollection in regard to the broad features of this most vital aspect of legal practice. Today, litigation
is increasingly complex, court calendars are often congested and
trial time is frequently expensive for both the client and his
counsel. Proper and judicious use of the available discovery tools
will undoubtedly expedite the resolution of conflict-the ultimate goal of every legal action. The "old hound" may never
be replaced, but the use of discovery provisions will prove a valuable addition to every fact finder's arsenal.

153. Id. at 81-82, 349 N.E.2d at 615.

